Journal of American Ethnic History
Winter 2020 VOLUME 39, NUMBER 2

TED SMYTH
     Abstract Drawing on two confidential reports, this article demon- strates the significant
political agency exercised in the 1980s by Irish and Irish American politicians supported by an
unusually robust form of ethnicity. Embodied in hundreds of cultural and fraternal
associations, this vigorous Irish American ethnicity was animated by political passion arising
out of the conflict in Northern Ireland. The first report, by the Irish Embassy in Washington in
1980, provided first- hand accounts of the widespread activities of Irish American associations,
with a view to enlisting their support in resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland. The embassy
and Irish American political leaders formed a powerful “Irish lobby” in Washington seeking a
solution based on nonviolence and equality between Catholic nationalists and Protestant
unionists, strengthening the hand of the Irish government in its negotiations with the British
government. The second report, compiled in 1988 by Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA,
sought to bring the Irish American republican movement into line with Sinn Féin’s recent
decision to seek a political solution to the conflict. As Sinn Féin moved gradually away from
violence, it exerted control over Noraid, the most important of the hardline Irish American
organizations. Both the Irish government and Sinn Féin mobilized an Irish American ethnicity
that, far from being merely “symbolic,” was rooted in tangible social and political processes in
which Irish immigrants and their descendants played the leading role. Whether that ethnicity
can retain its vitality in the absence of continued immigration and an animating political cause
is an open question.

I

HOW MANY OF THE FORTY MILLION Irish Americans self- identified in the 1980 US Federal Census were actively involved in Irish organizations? How critical was associational culture, especially Irish politi- cal nationalism, in Irish ethnic identity in the 1980s? How united or divided were Irish Americans in relation to the Northern Ireland conflict? How important was Irish American political leadership to the achievement of a lasting peace in Ireland?
Two confidential reports written in the 1980s provide new answers to these questions, offering a fresh insight into Irish ethnicity in the United States during a decade that was critical to peace in Northern Ireland.These reports, which allow for a transatlantic analysis of the interactions of the Irish Government and Sinn Féin/IRA with Irish America, demonstrate the significant political agency exercised in relation to Washington and the Northern Ireland conflict by an unusually robust Irish ethnicity in the 1980s.

The confidential Washington, DC Irish Embassy Report on Irish American Organizations was
commissioned in 1980 by the Irish ambassador to the United States, Seán Donlon.
1) The second report, Irish American Organiza- tions and Political Involvement , was secretly commissioned in1988 in Belfast by Sinn Féin, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army.
2) The Irish American organizations examined in the two reports represented Ireland’s diasporic community, which exercised a significant impact on the Northern Ireland conflict, either directly through support for violent or nonviolent activities or by influencing US Government engagement in the conflict. With British- Irish negotiations on Northern Ireland at a stalemate in 1980, the Irish Embassy Report was intended to provide Dublin with insights into how to channel Irish American concern and anger away from support for the IRA and toward support for a nonviolent solution.
An internal Department of Foreign Affairs memorandum in early 1981 confirmed that successive Irish governments were conscious of the potential of the United States to influence British policy on Northern Ireland and “have consequently sought to convince U.S. administrations andrepresentatives of the rightness of our views in order that they might exercise that influence.”
3) Sinn Féin’s essential objective in commissioning its report, by contrast, was to assert control over Noraid (Irish Northern Aid, the US fundraising agent of Sinn Féin/IRA) in order to seek
American support for Sinn Féin/IRA’s new strategy, which had changed from seeking power
solely through terrorism to pursuing a dual track strategy of violence combined with electoral
politics.
The two reports document a time of heightened transnational interde- pendency between Irish
America and Ireland. While this interdependency ultimately contributed critically to the Irish
peace process, sections of Irish America supported IRA violence for many years, provoking
conflict with the Irish government and raising questions as to who was in control, the home- land or the diaspora. Writing that a transnational approach to history has “considerable merits for the study of ethnic nationalism between Ireland and the United States,” historian Kevin Kenny quotes Thomas N. Brown’s classic observation that Irish American nationalism “was directed chiefly toward American, not Irish, ends.”
4) In this sense, Irish American nationalists saw the Northern Ireland conflict not only as a worthy cause to protect fellow Irish Catholics, but as a kind of quest for Irish authenticity in America, leading to “the increasing interest of second- and third- generation Irish Americans” in hardline republican organizations like Noraid.
5) Historian Brian Hanley noted how Noraid “claimed that its supporters were the ‘direct descendants of those’ who faced the same enemy (the British) at the ‘Bridge at Concord’ 200 years ago.”
6) The writer Jack Holland described this relationship as a “complex, Janus- like one, in which the past and future mingle and often cannot be distinguished from each other, in which the politician has a role along with the rebel.”
7)The Northern Ireland conflict and the discrimination against Catholic nationalists by the British government and by Protestant unionists animated many Americans of Irish descent whose sense of ethnic identity had faded in the mid- twentieth century migration from close- knit city parishes to the suburbs. Following the 1972 “Bloody Sunday” killings by the British army of thirteen unarmed Catholic marchers in Derry, the New York journalist Pete Hamill wrote, “Something exhilarating has happened to the Irish this past year, the reforging of a lost cultural identity.” Hamill cited the war in Belfast as a major factor in the sudden interest of young Irish Americans in their Irish ethnicity, the formation of “the New Irish who had moved on.”
8) The political activist Tom Hayden, whose great- grandparents had emigrated from Ireland, first realized he was “Irish on the inside” when he heard civil rights marchers in Northern Ireland singing “We Shall Overcome” in 1968.
9) Hundreds of existing and new Irish American associations organized protests and resolutions denouncing British rule, a level of ethnic political engagement not seen
in Irish America since the campaign for Irish independence in the early 1900s. Some Irish
Americans, reared on stories and songs of British brutality against the Irish from the nineteenth century famine to the Black and Tans in 1919–1921, were drawn to the conclusion that only the violent defeat of the British would secure justice for Catholics in Northern Ireland.
The Embassy and Sinn Féin reports highlight the efforts in the 1980s by the Irish Government and Noraid to win the support of this reenergized Irish America for two sharply contrasting solutions to the Northern Ireland conflict. The Irish Government sought Irish American and US
government support for the achievement of Irish unity by exclusively peaceful means, including the consent of Protestant unionists. Sinn Féin/IRA, on the other hand, sought weapons and support from Irish Americans for a terrorist campaign to force British withdrawal from Northern Ireland against the wishes of the Protestant unionist community. Following years of killings and bombings by extremists in both communities in Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin began to understand in the mid-1980s that violence was not effective and devoted more resources to a political campaign. The Embassy Report details the intensive push by Irish diplomats and visiting politicians from Ireland to seek the backing of hundreds of Irish American associations and media for the Irish government’s goals.
10) The Sinn Féin Report focused on two subjects as Sinn Féin sought support for its evolving electoral strategy in Northern Ireland, a policy vehemently opposed by Noraid’s leaders who favored armed force. First, the report highlighted the perceived deficien- cies of Noraid, observing that “within the Irish American Community the entire organization is generally regarded as ‘terrorist and conspiratorial.’”
11) Second, and relatedly, the report sought to create the
“broadest possible alliance” in support of Sinn Féin/IRA, including New York politician Peter
King’s position that Noraid needed to “acquire a front organization,” ideally “an untarnished
‘front line’ organization like the AOH (Ancient Order of Hibernians) which it ought to control.” 12) Importantly, the Irish government did succeed in creating a broad and powerful coalition of Irish American politicians and organizations, not in support of Irish unity, but in support of a policy that recognized the equal rights of Catholic nationalists and Protestant unionists in Northern
Ireland, a policy later termed “parity of esteem.”
13) Both the Embassy and Sinn Féin reports point up the crucial standing of Irish American organizations in the politics of the “Irish Question” on both sides of the Atlantic. And both documents reveal their authors’ ideological leanings in their separate, competing approaches to secure the support of Irish America for their sharply
competing campaigns.

II

The Embassy Report details the remarkably broad and dynamic range of organizations that
constituted Irish America in 1980. The report provides intricate information on hundreds of
thriving associations—county, Emer- ald, philanthropic, and cultural—many of them vying to
define Irish ethnic identity across lines of class, religion, gender, politics, and income levels.
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40 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter 2020
Irish diplomats delivered the Irish government message to as many events as possible, speaking at
breakfasts (including Roman Catholic Communion Breakfasts), lunches, parades, feisianna (arts
and culture festivals), lectures, plays, debates, ceilis (dances) and balls, sporting events,
installation of soci- ety officers, picnics, music festivals, and “last but not least, Irish pubs.” 14
From the Irish government’s perspective, fundraising by Noraid, with its overt support for the IRA,
constituted support for terrorism—weaken- ing Irish nationalism, destabilizing the Irish
Republic—and needed to be openly opposed at every opportunity. This led to confrontations with
sec- tions of Irish America, including the leadership of the largest Irish American association, the
Ancient Order of Hibernians. It is clear from the Embassy Report that the divisions and
controversy arising from the Northern Ireland conflict permeated, and to some extent animated,
just about every aspect of Irish ethnic engagement, including culture, arts, philanthropy, Gaelic
games, Irish music, parades, county associations, and Emerald societies. Notwithstanding the
problem that sections of Irish America supported IRA violence, the Irish Government was careful
not to be seen to lecture Irish Americans. “While few Irish Americans will accept a didactic
message from Dublin as to whom they should endorse or support,” a Department of Foreign
Affairs brief noted, “it is possible to harness their assumptions and appeal to their concerns, for
example, by emphasizing the hope of secur- ing the coming together of the Irish people and the
need for reconciliation between the communities in Northern Ireland as necessary first steps.” 15
In the initial stage of the Northern Ireland conflict in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the Irish
government and Irish America had been manifestly unsuccessful in persuading President Nixon
to criticize horrendous Brit- ish government actions in Northern Ireland such as the 1971
internment of Catholic nationalists and the 1972 Bloody Sunday shootings. Ambas- sador Donlon
noted that when he served in Boston in the late 1960s, the Irish American community did not
have significant political influence in Washington: “My view was formed in part by conversations
with Speaker of the US House of Representatives, John McCormack. I remember, in particular,
bringing John Hume to see the Speaker in his Boston office in October 1969. John had just
addressed the Donegal Men’s Association. The Speaker politely but firmly told us that the people
whom we should be talking to were the politicians on Capitol Hill, many of whom were hungry
for information about Northern Ireland.” 16
In the 1970s, this strategy of engaging Irish American leaders in Wash- ington began to pay off. By
the middle of the decade, a new Irish diplomatic
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Smyth 41
campaign focusing on powerful Irish American politicians won support for reforms in Northern
Ireland that would undermine the IRA’s appeal. In a demonstration of ethnic political agency that
rivaled that of the Jewish lobby, the Irish Embassy and John Hume forged a powerful coalition in
Washington centered on the “Four Horsemen” of Irish America: Speaker Thomas P. O’Neill,
Senators Edward Kennedy and Patrick Moynihan, and Governor Hugh Carey of New York. Irish
American politicians had engaged with the cause of Irish freedom in the past, but none were as
powerful or as committed as Tip O’Neill during his speakership from 1977 to 1987, when he had
significant influence with Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. O’Neill was ably backed
in the Senate by Senator Ted Kennedy, a senior politician with enormous influence both in his
own right and as a brother of President Kennedy and Senator Bobby Kennedy. The “Four
Horsemen,” supported by the vast majority of the Irish ethnic community, played a major role in
ensuring the success of the Irish peace process.
In 1977, Speaker O’Neill persuaded President Carter to recognize the legitimate role of the Irish
government in Northern Ireland, a first for the US government, which had hitherto only
recognized British rule in that province. Four years later, at the urging of John Hume and
Ambassador Donlon, Speaker O’Neill created the Congressional Friends of Ireland, a grouping of
the most influential senators and congressmen in the country. President Reagan went to the Irish
Embassy to endorse the Friends organiza- tion, calling on “all Americans to question closely any
appeal for financial or other aid from groups involved in the conflict to ensure that contribu- tions
do not end up in the hands of those who perpetuate violence.” 17 Jack Holland concluded that the
reason the Irish government succeeded in these negotiations with the British government “was
due in large measure to the power and influence of the American connection and the success with
which Irish diplomats utilized it.” 18
The 1980 Irish Embassy Report on Irish American Organizations pro- vided important details on
Irish American political agency. Whereas tens of millions of Irish Americans celebrated their
ancestry on St. Patrick’s Day, maybe two to four million engaged regularly with the twelve
national and 221 local Irish American organizations covered in the Embassy Report . 19 Irish
diplomats regularly briefed these associations, averaging five evening functions a week and “very
few officers stationed at the Consulates General ever [had] a weekend without some engagement
in the Irish American com- munity.” 20 Ambassador Donlon wrote that more frequent informal
contact with individuals and small groups within the community “was an even
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without the permission of the University of Illinois Press.
42 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter 2020
more effective way of maintaining the links and encouraging Irish Ameri- cans to support the
economic, political and cultural objectives of the Irish Government.” 21
Irish American associations that attracted leaders in business, the profes- sions, and academe
tended to support the Irish government’s position on Northern Ireland. A prominent example was
the Ireland Fund, set up by business leader Tony O’Reilly (later Sir Anthony O’Reilly) and
Pittsburgh Steelers owner Dan Rooney in 1976. The fund sought to channel the gen- erosity and
concern of Irish Americans away from violence to the goals of peace, culture, and charity.
O’Reilly endeavored to educate and inform the American public “about what he saw as the
complexities of Irish identity and how that inflamed passions dangerously.” 22 The Ireland Fund
hosted black tie dinners in major American cities, with its annual New York dinner, “the biggest
and best organized of such functions . . .raising an estimated total of $150,000 in 1980.” 23
Similar associations included the American- Irish Foundation, set up by Ireland’s president Éamon
de Valera and US President John F. Kennedy in 1963 to promote cultural and educational links
between both countries. “It has had its ups and downs,” the Embassy Report observed, “but in
recent years under the active Presidency of Bill Vincent (of County Kerry and San Francisco), it
has been substantially reorganized . . . making grants total- ing $94,933.00.” 24 The Irish
Fellowship Club of Chicago, which included “among its members prominent Chicago- Irish
politicians, judges, business- men and professional people . . . organized a successful public
function on the occasion of the then Taoiseach’s official visit to the United States.” 25 The Eire
Society of Boston invited Speaker O’Neill and John Hume as guests of honor at its annual
dinners, drawing on each occasion a large crowd decid- edly in favor of a constitutional
nonviolent solution in Northern Ireland. These associations were also critical for achieving the
Irish government’s economic goals of increased investment by Irish American corporate leaders
in order to create badly needed jobs in Ireland.
The Friendly Sons of St. Patrick—wealthy, prestigious, male- only groups found in most cities with
large Irish American populations—could also be relied on to support the Irish Government’s goal
to reconcile Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. The charters of the Friendly Sons in
Philadelphia (the oldest Irish association in America, founded in 1771) and Boston ensured that
those Friendly Sons functioned as mixed Catholic/ Protestant groups, with the presidency rotating
every year, harking back to a pre- Famine time when Irish Catholic and Protestant immigrants
frequently
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Smyth 43
belonged to the same merchant and professional class. The Embassy Report observed that in most
cities, “membership of the Friendly Sons was a badge of Irish- American success,” but “their
direct connection with Ireland or Irish affairs is in most cases very limited.” 26 Many of their
members regularly visited Ireland as tourists, but most avoided the controversy arising from the
violence in Northern Ireland, preferring to stay on the sidelines.
The Irish government’s ability to rally support for its Northern Ireland pol- icies in the United
States, particularly in Washington, depended on securing support among the American media.
Irish diplomats and visiting politicians like John Hume regularly engaged with columnists and
editors seeking sup- port for the US government’s political pressure on the British government.
American television coverage tended to simplistic and intermittent coverage of the conflict,
framing it either in terms of a religious war or “IRA versus Brits.” Notable exceptions were CBS
television’s documentary “A Tale of Two Irelands” in 1975 and ABC TV’s, “To Die for Ireland”
in 1980. Irish diplomats mostly focused on newspaper editorial boards and nationally syndicated
columnists such as Mary McGrory of the Washington Post , Dave Nyhan of the Boston Globe , and
Michael Killian of the Chicago Tribune . Some of the London- based US journalists who covered
the Northern Ireland conflict tended to take the British government line that little could be done to
solve the “Irish Problem,” but in the United States, Irish diplomats and Irish American
organizations persuaded editors and producers to support a more interventionist policy by the
United States. For example, the New York Times , which had in the 1970s warned against US
involvement in Northern Ireland, praised the Congressional Friends of Ireland in 1981 for
“establishing a new forum for the responsible discussion of what Americans can and should do to
help.” 27 The Philadelphia Enquirer also supported a greater American role in finding a solution.
“The time has come for the U.S. government to press Mrs. Thatcher harder to be more flexible,
with quiet diplomacy if possible,” as one editorial stated, “but failing that with the outspoken
frankness that the deteriorating situation demands.” 28
Irish American ethnic media were much more anti- British in their tone and sometimes ambivalent
about the IRA violence. Of the ten Irish Ameri- can newspapers listed in the Embassy Report , the
largest of them, The Irish Echo , was described as “usually positive towards government policies
but at times critical and impatient.” 29 The Irish American News in Chicago had “noncontroversial”
political appeal, while the Boston Irish News aimed at “impartiality.” More
troubling for the Irish government was the Irish People , edited by the spokesman for Noraid,
Martin Galvin. It was composed of
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44 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter 2020
local Noraid news and items reprinted from An Phoblacht , the Sinn Féin newspaper in Ireland.
The Irishman , a new paper edited by Niall O’Dowd in San Francisco, was characterized by the
Embassy as “independent.” In addition, the Embassy Report noted fifty- seven regular radio
programs broadcast across the United States, usually of one- hour duration on week- ends,
concentrating on Irish music, interviews, reports on local events, and sports results from Ireland. 30
The Embassy Report profiled five additional associations whose popu- larity and reach across the
United States demonstrated the cohering power of Irish sports, music, language, and culture in
shaping ethnic identity and political influence. Some of these organizations proved problematic
politi- cally for the Irish government on Northern Ireland, including the Gaelic Athletic
Association (GAA) and Comhaltas Ceoltóirí Eireann (CCE). 31 Founded in Ireland in 1884, the
GAA had been active in the United States for nearly one hundred years but faced “decline, mainly
because of the end- ing of immigration from Ireland.” 32 In 1980, Gaelic sports were still played in
the New York City area and in Albany, the greater Boston area, New Haven and Hartford,
Connecticut, and in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, and Seattle. In Boston, the GAA Board “organize[d] an annual banquet to which the
Consulate [was] invited.” 33 The GAA was also “strong in Chicago” with “approxi- mately
fourteen local clubs, each with reasonably good membership.” 34 Irish Embassy diplomats “had not
been invited to the annual dinner of the GAA since 1977 due to the pro- Noraid sympathies of the
leadership,” although the diplomats did regularly attend the GAA annual feis in Gaelic Park, New
York. 35
Irish music too was caught up in Irish politics, with the New York Con- sulate excluded from the
1980 Comhaltas Ceoltóirí Eireann metropolitan concerts, a slight attributed to the influence of
Noraid, “which had tables selling material and literature” at the concert. 36 Comhaltas Ceoltóirí,
founded in 1951 to promote Irish music and dance, was thriving in 1980 in “many centers,
notably New York, Hartford, Boston, Chicago, Saint Louis, San Francisco, Los Angeles,
Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh.” 37 However, the New York Consulate was in
regular contact with Bill McEvoy, the US tour coordinator and a leading member of the New
York – area CCE. The Boston Consulate reported that the local chapter of CCE was “very active”
organizing “regular ceilis and seisuns with a view to eventually purchasing their own premises.”
Irish diplomats were “in close contact and [had] friendly relations with [its] officers and
members.” 38
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Smyth 45
The embassy also reported on the role of groups teaching the Irish language in the United States.
The principal group, the Gaelic League, remained largely free of divisions over Northern Ireland
according to the Embassy Report. The Consul General in Chicago pointed out that the local
Gaelic League had “no connections with political groups” and the Consul- ate had “good relations
with its officers.” 39 The Embassy Report stated that “Irish classes and other activities to promote a
knowledge and awareness of the language were especially well attended in New York, Boston,
Chicago, Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Detroit, and there were few centres of Irish
American activity where someone was not involved in organizing Irish classes.” 40
The American Conference for Irish Studies (ACIS), founded in 1962, exercised a significant
educational influence in American universities, but very few courses explicitly covered the
Northern Ireland conflict in the early 1980s. 41 ACIS published a newsletter for seven hundred
members and participated “in joint activities with other U.S. academic groups such as the
American Historical Association and the Modern Language Association.” 42 All the Irish
diplomatic offices in the United States in 1980 reported host- ing receptions for ACIS
conferences and there was little evidence of any support for IRA/Sinn Féin. The Irish American
Cultural Institute (IACI), founded by Dr. Eoin McKiernan in Minnesota in 1964, was “organized
strictly along cultural lines with no religious or political point of view.” 43 The Embassy Report
observed that McKiernan used television documentaries and visiting theatre groups and artists
from Ireland to continue “his personal mission of increasing the awareness in the United States of
the Irish cultural achievement.” 44 With Princess Grace of Monaco as IACI Honorary Chair,
McKiernan inaugurated a popular “Irish Way” summer enrichment program that brought
hundreds of Irish American teenagers to Ireland every year.
While much of the cultural vitality of Irish American organizations related to the increased interest
in the Northern Ireland conflict, it also reflected a deep appreciation by millions of Irish
Americans for their rich heritage, especially the literature of Nobel Prize – winning writers like
Yeats, Shaw and Beckett. In addition, during the 1980s many Irish American associa- tions were
boosted by the arrival of thousands of Irish immigrants fleeing recession at home, with the lower
skilled among them gravitating “toward their ethnic group, where informal networks facilitate(d)
their entry into the labor market.” 45 Many of these “New Irish” were undocumented, motivating
Irish American leaders to form the Irish Immigration Reform Movement (IIRM), which
successfully delivered a series of visa lotteries in the 1980s
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46 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter 2020
for thousands of these immigrants. As one writer noted, “Northern Ireland was a hot political
issue” for this movement which did not want to offend “the American political establishment and
Irish Americans.” 46 And even if a minority of the undocumented had sympathies for Noraid, they
tended to keep their distance from Noraid events knowing that many were under FBI surveillance.
The Embassy’s competition with Noraid for influence became more appar- ent in the Irish county
associations and Emerald societies, which tended to attract members disdainful of British and
WASP culture in general. Follow- ing the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, severely
limiting immigration from Ireland, the county associations ceased to be a national force. Only
New York City, where twenty- three of Ireland’s thirty- two counties had associa- tions, showed
regular activity, including the annual dinner of the United Irish Counties where both the Irish
Government representatives and Noraid were acknowledged, a compromise that often led to
friction. 47 Unlike the county associations, the Emerald organizations drew on a broader spectrum
of Irish America than the first- generation immigrant, being active in civil service sectors like
police, fire, and sanitation that had multi- generational hiring traditions. By 1980, the Embassy
felt that its anti- violence message was being heard more widely in these circles, reporting that the
Emerald societies were “usually anxious to identify with Ireland in some way.” 48
The Embassy Report did, however, express particular concerns about the Ancient Order of
Hibernians. Restricted to Catholics of Irish descent, the AOH had an estimated 171,000 members
in 1980. 49 The Embassy reported that even though only 385 delegates attended the 1980 AOH
annual conven- tion in Florida, that was where Noraid had succeeded in securing support. The
National Board had “severed all formal contact” with Irish government representatives “though
individual diplomats continue to maintain contact with some Board members.” 50 The Consulate
General in Boston reported that both the national AOH president, Jack Connolly, a native of
Massachusetts, and the Massachusetts state AOH president, Gerard Sexton, were members of
Noraid: “There have been instances of Noraid functions having been held in AOH premises and
of cooperation . . . in the organization of func- tions.” The Chicago Consulate reported that some
AOH “members whom we know [were] inclined to take an anti- Government stand on Northern
Ireland . . . I was speaking to an AOH member recently who told me that they had approximately
1,000 members in Chicago, but this organization had been dormant for some time. He said they
were hoping to revive it.” The Rockland County, New York AOH founded a Political Education
Committee
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Smyth 47
(PEC) in 1975 that had expanded to four state branches “very critical of Irish Government policy
on Northern Ireland.” Suffolk County, New York’s division was “well disposed to Irish
Government policy,” but the Bronx and Nassau County AOH Boards had active pro – IRA
factions. New York’s Irish Consulate told Dublin that the Chairman of the AOH’s “Freedom for
All Ireland Committee,” Martin Higgins, collected “circa $7/8,000 p.a. for ‘Green Cross’, Belfast
for ‘relief of families of political prisoners’” and that New Jersey’s AOH committee opened a
“Book of Freedom” to record the names of those who were dying in Ireland’s current struggle for
freedom. 51 The Embassy, cautioning against exaggerating the differences between the Irish
government and the AOH, observed that the overwhelming number of AOH divisions in the
United States maintained excellent relations with official Irish representatives and went out of
their way to dissociate them- selves from the pro- IRA actions of the National Board. The
Connecticut State AOH was in “regular contact” with the New York Consulate, which reported
on their “moderate approach on Northern Ireland.” 52 The Boston Consulate maintained informal,
helpful, and friendly relations with officers and members of the AOH, in particular “Rev. Daniel
Bowen, chaplain of the organization who was well disposed towards the Irish Government’s
position.” 53
At a time when support for IRA violence had been waning in Irish Amer- ica, the IRA hunger
strikes in 1981and the death of imprisoned IRA leader Bobby Sands, in particular, renewed
widespread anger against the British government and rekindled support for the IRA and Noraid.
Nevertheless, some of the Sinn Féin leaders like Gerry Adams realized the limitations of a purely
violent campaign and became convinced by the election of Bobby Sands to the British parliament
before he died that electoral politics could also advance the cause of Irish unity. Sinn Féin
spokesman Danny Morrison rhetorically asked, who will object “if with a ballot paper in this
hand and an Armalite in this hand, we take power in Ireland?” 54
III
The inherent contradictions of seeking power through violence and the democratic process would
eventually require Sinn Féin to make a choice between the two paths. In 1986, Adams, chairman
of Sinn Féin since 1983, started down the electoral route by persuading the Sinn Féin annual
confer- ence to remove its ban on taking seats in the Irish parliament. Some republi- can
hardliners led by Ruairí O Brádaigh walked out and formed Republican
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48 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter 2020
Sinn Féin, but Adams retained the support of the majority for the dual track articulated by
Morrison. Adams sought to pursue this new strategy in the United States, arguing that “a greater
awareness by publicity and political campaigns” would be advantageous for Sinn Féin. 55 This
precipitated an internal contest for control of Noraid, whose leaders like Michael Flannery had
already profoundly disagreed with Adams, believing that involvement in politics would detract
from the primary purpose of raising cash, forc- ing Noraid to compromise its support for the
“armed struggle.” Adams and Sinn Féin had already moved beyond this hardline position when in
1986, the Belfast Redemptorist priest Fr. Alec Reid said to Irish Opposi- tion Leader Charles
Haughey that Adams “believed there was a stalemate and that neither the British nor the IRA
could win the war.” 56 Adams and Ted Howell, Sinn Féin’s foreign affairs director, seemed
determined to use the Sinn Féin Report to bring Noraid into line with their new strategy, even if it
meant undermining veteran Noraid leaders. It seems likely that Adams and Howell commissioned
the Sinn Féin Report to this end, choos- ing as its authors Declan Kearney and Oistin MacBride,
who would spend three months interviewing key Irish American supporters across the United
States. 57 Both authors had strong Republican credentials to offset Noraid leadership suspicions;
Kearney’s father, Oliver, was an active supporter of the MacBride Principles on fair
employment. 58 Oistin MacBride’s brother, Antoine, an IRA member, had been shot dead by the
British SAS (Special Air Service) in 1984. 59
In November 1988, the completed Sinn Féin Report was mailed to Noraid executives in the United
States, prefaced by a letter from Sinn Féin treasurer (and veteran Irish republican) Joe Cahill and
Ted Howell. 60 “As promised in our last letter,” they wrote, “find attached our views on the
importance of USA vis- à- vis the struggle in Ireland and our position on some ways by which the
requirements of the Irish struggle might be advanced in the USA. The contents of the paper are
not gospel. They do however provide the background against which the discussions at our
meeting will take place and encompass most of the relevant points of the appropriate agenda.” 61
The Report ’s 180 pages included sections on “The International Dimen- sion,” “Cooperation and
Collaboration Between INA (Noraid) and the Irish American Community,” “The Role of the INA
Executive,” “The Operation of the INA Office and Irish People ,” “Political Lobbying and
Publicity,” plus “Area Profiles of the INA Organization.” 62 The Report was scathing in its
criticism of the Noraid leadership, asserting it did not have “the ability to administrate [sic] or
control INA on a planned national basis. And it is
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Smyth 49
not representative of the organization with regard to gender, geography or generation.” 63    In the Report ’s “Conclusions,” Noraid is described as “lethar- gic and impoverished.”
64   Noraid had indeed received very little support from the American media for its demand that the British withdraw from Northern Ireland, although the Sinn Féin Report stated that there were many journalists who “must be identified and cultivated in a systematic way,” including Dennis Hamill and Dennis Duggan of Newsday , Pete Hamill of the Village Voice , syndicated columnist Jimmy Breslin of the Daily News , Frank Lynn of the New York Times , and Warren Hinckle of the San Francisco Chronicle .
65   The fact that only five hundred people had joined a protest in New
York City against the British government in 1981 led Breslin to conclude that “Their presence did more to point out the disappearance of the Irish in America than it did to provoke outrage against the British.” 66 Despite extensive American media coverage, the IRA hunger strikes failed to secure legitimacy for Sinn Féin/ IRA in the United States. As sociologist Aogán Mulcahy later concluded, “The dominant news frame used to report the Northern Irish conflict reflects the discourse of terrorism and has conspicuously failed to bestow legiti- macy on paramilitary organizations.” 67 The negative reaction by the Irish government and US establishment to the selection of Noraid leader Michael Flannery as grand marshal of the New York St. Patrick’s Day
parade in 1983 confirmed this absence of legitimacy. The American media denounced what they
saw as the endorsement of IRA terrorism, many politicians and schools withdrew from the
parade, and all US Army bands boycotted the event. New York’s Cardinal Cooke refused to give
Flannery the usual public greeting of the grand marshal at St. Patrick’s Cathedral, but he did meet
him privately to stress “that the way of violence was futile, immoral and interfering with the
peace process.” 68 The Cardinal, reflecting the policy of the Irish Government and the “Four
Horsemen,” told Flannery he was “well aware of denial of human rights and justice in the North
of Ireland, and that by the political process something had to be done about it.” 69
While most of the Irish American media offered a voice to both the Irish government and Sinn
Féin, some editors were more partisan. Pat Farrelly, the Irish- born editor of the Irish Voice
newspaper (founded by Niall O’Dowd in New York City in 1987) seemed “to be a strong
supporter” of Sinn Féin according to the Sinn Féin Report . 70 Farrelly is quoted as believing that
“the solution to building a viable political presence in the U.S. rest[ed] in the maintenance of a
Sinn Féin presence” and that the republican move- ment needed to “fill the void left by Noraid’s
exclusivist emphasis upon
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50 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter 2020
fundraising.” He recommended “systematic infiltration of the Irish Immi- gration Reform
Movement (IIRM) and concurrent agitation amongst the immigrant youth” who were, in his
opinion, “highly embittered against the [Irish] Free State.” 71 Farrelly saw the need for “an
articulate and intelligent spokesperson” because “it was a source of concern to him that Hume and
the Free State government officials are allowed to propagandize with impunity throughout the
U.S.” 72
Sinn Féin enjoyed greater success in securing support from American labor unions, especially local
unions, which seemed to have fewer reserva- tions about IRA violence. Brian Hanley observed
that “Trade unions with large Irish memberships or with an Irish leadership such as the New York
Transport Workers Union . . . were all early financial contributors to the organization.” 73 George
Meaney, the first president of the AFL and CIO from 1955–1979, was of Irish descent and
sympathized with Irish national- ists in Northern Ireland. John Sweeney, whose parents came
from county Leitrim and who became president of Local 32B- 32J representing 55,000 building
maintenance workers in Greater New York, frequently attended Sinn Fein events. Sweeney was
grand marshal of the New York St. Patrick’s Day parade in 1979. 74 The executive secretary of the
California AFL/CIO, John Henning, strongly supported the San Francisco Noraid unit. 75 Teddy
Gleason, president of the International Longshoremen’s Association, also elected grand marshal
of the New York St Patrick’s Day parade, was a long term Noraid sponsor. 76 Noraid and a small
group called the Irish American Labor Coalition led by Joe Jameson backed the MacBride
Principles to generate American labor union support for fair employment for Catholics in
Northern Ireland. The Sinn Féin Report nevertheless described Jameson as “a closet radical
socialist” who advised the authors to “study the experi- ence and development of the ANC, PLO
and FMLN [sic] in establishing operations in the US.” 77 Jameson said that American progressives
and the working class were natural allies and “cast aspersions upon the value or long- term
commitment” of Peter King’s support, “deriving as it does from the US right.” 78
While Noraid had little success in penetrating cultural organizations such as the Gaelic League, the
American Conference for Irish Studies, or the Irish American Cultural Institute, the Sinn Féin
Report reviewed two additional Irish associations that were more supportive. The Irish American
Unity Con- ference (IAUC), created by Texas millionaire Jim Delaney in 1983, sought to create a
pan- Irish American alliance to pursue Irish reunification and national self- determination.
Andrew Wilson observed that “the formation
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Smyth 51
of the IAUC raised great enthusiasm and expectations among militant Irish American groups.” 79
However, the IAUC’s reliance upon Delaney “came to an abrupt conclusion when his corporation
sustained financial difficulties” in 1987, causing him to step down as president and compromising
the IAUC’s potential for Sinn Féin. 80 The second organization, Clan na Gael, once the American
powerhouse for Irish nationalism, had declined to what the Sinn Féin Report estimated as a
national membership of only 150. The report added that, despite its formal links with Sinn Féin,
the Clan was “riven with conflict, suspicion and intense disharmony.” 81 The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) was closely monitoring the Clan in 1988, which may explain this level of
disharmony and distrust. A “source of good reliability” to the Bureau advised that if current
internal problems in Noraid were not resolved, “Clan na Gael will be the organization that
emerges as the major support organization for the republican cause” because, although the total
monies it collected were less “than those collected by Noraid, 100 percent of those monies [went]
to the armed struggle.” 82 The FBI source clearly exag- gerated the ability of the mostly dormant
Clan na Gael to rival Noraid. One of the Clan’s few active branches was in Toledo, Ohio, where
they “organized demonstrations against British officials throughout the Midwest.” 83
Like the Embassy Report , the Sinn Féin Report concluded that Noraid’s influence among Irish
Americans was exaggerated by the media, except during those periods of heightened anti- British
outrage such as Bloody Sun- day in 1972 and the IRA hunger strikes in 1981. The Embassy
Report had recorded that “the vast majority of Irish Americans remained aloof ” from Noraid.
The Sinn Féin Report similarly observed that Noraid’s “introverted- ness and self- generated poor
image means that it has a credibility threshold to cross in making outreach to the vast human
rights/progressive constitu- ency.” 84 Some of those interviewed in the Sinn Féin Report
complained that the Irish government and John Hume had much greater access to power and
influence in America than Noraid. The “Four Horsemen” had publicly denounced Noraid in 1977,
and two of the leaders, Senator Moynihan and Governor Carey, refused to join the 1982 New
York St. Patrick’s Day parade that chose Noraid leader Michael Flannery as grand marshal.
According to returns submitted to the US Department of Justice, Noraid had more than thirty units
in the United States and raised $180,000 in 1980, with the greater portion of this coming from the
East Coast. 85 One estimate in 1984 put Noraid’s membership at “5,000 members across the United
States,” although “many of these were not necessarily active.” 86 Noraid’s annual dinner in 1980
was “attended by about 1,200 people” and garnered
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52 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter 2020
“$25,000 in advertising revenue.” 87 In New York City, fundraising occurred in all five boroughs
for the “Million Pennies” collection in Irish bars. The Boston Consulate reported five Noraid
units in its jurisdiction; Lynn’s was the most active, with fundraising events like dances and
“family musical and film afternoons.” Noraid worked “out of a number of pubs in the Chicago
area and suburbs,” the Embassy Report observed. 88
But Noraid had become significantly weaker by 1988, not only because of the IRA bombing and
killing of civilians in Ireland and Britain, but because of the US Department of Justice’s success
in having the group register as an agent of the Provisional IRA since 1981.The Sinn Féin Report’s
detailed analysis of Noraid’s state and city chapters in the Northeast and Midwest asserted that
only a minority of members was active, with ten to twenty activists in each chapter. According to
one writer, the “terrorism” label “kept Noraid on the margins of political life and restricted its
appeal to a handful of traditional Irish republicans and Irish American activists.” 89
The Ancient Order of Hibernians, however, was a potential cover for much deeper republican
support. The Sinn Féin Report , while noting that the AOH was in “poor shape as regards
leadership material,” concluded that it “continues to be of central importance within a large part
of the Irish American community . . . capable of applying some political muscle when it tries and
gets disproportionate results because of its standing as the biggest Irish American organization
and its ultra- clean image. There is not much anti- republicanism as such, more passive ignorance
of our position, something that can surely be capitalized on.” 90 In an interview summarized in the
Sinn Féin Report , the New York politician Peter King, noting that Noraid’s influence was
“restricted because of its association with SF/IRA,” advised that Noraid “leadership and [Irish]
republican – controlled AOH leadership [could] create a formula for developing an all- embracing
U.S. structure for maximizing political action on Ireland.” 91 Then Comptroller for New York’s
Nassau County, King was a second generation Irish Ameri- can whose grandmother, a staunch
Irish republican from County Limerick, thought Michael Collins was a traitor and Éamon De
Valera a hero. 92 As a politician in New York, King said he saw what American Jews were able to
achieve, and what African Americans were doing about South Africa, and yet “Northern Ireland
was being inaccurately reported.” 93 “While I don’t support everything the IRA did,” he later
recalled, “there was something legitimate there.” 94
For King, the AOH “was of central importance” to Noraid . . . “Five- eighths of AOH membership
are socializers,” he noted, “while leadership
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Smyth 53
and core activists are republicans.” 95 This assessment was echoed by his- torian John Ridge, who
stated, “The only thing Irish” for many was their surname.” 96 King believed the AOH had “a lot of
political potential because it [was] respectable within the Irish American community,” but the key
was who was national president at any given time. In 1988 “Nick Murphy [was] dangerous
because [he was] only political in so far as it [was] expedient to do so.” 97 The Sinn Féin Report ’s
authors concurred that Murphy was “somewhat ineffectual and tend[ed] to sway too much in the
political breeze of the day. He attended the dinner in New York City for Charlie Haughey [elected
Taoiseach of Ireland in 1987] recently which caused dissent in the ranks.” 98 The past president of
the AOH, Joe Roche, however, would “doubtless continue to be a contact and a potential ally
when it is expedient for him.” 99 The Sinn Féin Report wrote that the AOH had “access to the
media and the [Catholic] Church” that gave “it a disproportionate amount of influence.”
Another related organization, the Irish National Caucus (INC), had emerged in late 1973 with the
support of Noraid and the AOH to lobby in Washington for Irish republican issues. Founded by
Northern Ireland – born priest, Fr. Seán McManus, it enjoyed some initial success as a support
group for the IRA in Washington, forming the Ad- Hoc Congressional Committee for Irish
Affairs before it was eclipsed by Speaker O’Neill’s Congressional Friends of Ireland. Both the
Sinn Féin Report and the Embassy Report dismissed the influence of the INC, with the Embassy
noting that INC “pro- paganda is aimed primarily at Belfast and Dublin media and at some Irish
American newspapers.” 100 The Sinn Féin Report asserted that the INC had “dwindled in
importance in recent years” while still managing to “maintain public prominence.” 101
Nevertheless, the INC played a major role in banning the sale of US weapons to the Northern
Ireland police in 1979 and launched the MacBride Principles in 1984. 102
In December 1988, Gerry Adams, armed with the Sinn Féin Report ’s neg- ative findings about
Noraid, bluntly informed Noraid’s national executive at a meeting in Dublin that its efforts “were
too limited, and that it would have to build contacts with ‘progressive’ organizations in the
U.S.” 103 According to the Irish Voice , the result of the meeting was a unanimous agreement to
expand the Noraid executive and “work towards becoming national and democratic in
structure.” 104 Supporters of Adams’s electoral policy were added to the Noraid executive, and
within a year, many of the original Noraid leaders were marginalized, resigning from the
organization to form the Friends of Irish Freedom (FOIF), “devoted exclusively to raising funds
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54 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter 2020
for the families of republican prisoners.” 105 Hardline Republicans such as Michael Flannery,
aggrieved by being outmaneuvered by Sinn Féin, placed full- page advertisements in the Irish
Echo and Irish Voice denouncing the betrayal of Noraid’s original mission. The Irish People , now
solidly support- ive of Sinn Féin, responded with an article headlined, “No Split in Noraid,”
asserting that Honorary President Pat O’Connell had privately resigned and that the Executive
unanimously supported “a more thorough, coordinated, strategic and vocal approach to solidarity
work that would complement and eventually increase fundraising potential and increase
membership.” 106 Sinn Féin issued a sharp repudiation of the criticism, claiming that the names on
the advertisements “will undoubtedly be used by British propagandists to undermine support for
the dependents of prisoners and is, in effect, an abandonment of the Irish Republican
Movement.” 107 FOIF engaged in protracted hostility with the Sinn Féin – dominated Noraid for a
number of years thereafter, identifying with the breakaway extremist groups Republi- can Sinn
Féin and the “Real IRA” in Ireland, and opposing the 1994 IRA cease- fire. The FBI added FOIF
to its surveillance list, reporting that it “increased in popularity and fund- raising capabilities in
the New York and Boston areas . . . allegedly dealing direct with Republican Sinn Féin in the
County Tyrone area.” 108
Importantly for Adams and the Irish peace process, Noraid and the new leadership in the United
States installed by Sinn Féin subsequently endorsed both the 1994 IRA ceasefire and the 1998
Good Friday Agreement, both of them intensely supported by President Clinton and the
Congressional Friends of Ireland. Notably, the Good Friday Agreement included the right of a
majority in Northern Ireland to reject a united Ireland, a traditional non- starter for Irish
republicans. Ed Moloney later speculated that the mar- ginalization of the hardliners like Flannery
from Noraid back in 1989 “was another bonus, possibly unanticipated, possibly well anticipated.
When the IRA declared its ceasefire . . . the American opposition had already left town. By
chance or design, the Kearney- MacBride report had pulled Noraid’s sharpest teeth.” 109
CONCLUSION
The significant political agency exercised by an unusually robust Irish ethnicity in the 1980s
demonstrates that it had not entered the stage of “late- generation ethnicity,” defined by
sociologist Herbert Gans as being confined “almost entirely to feelings,” not actions. 110 The Irish
American community
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Smyth 55
that emerges from the two reports is closer to what Conzen et al. describe as “a dynamic process
of ethnicization . . . where power and politics, in the broadest sense, both internal to the groups
and in their external relation with ‘others,’ are basic to the formation and preservation of
ethnicities.” 111 This dynamic was stimulated by political passion arising out of the conflict in
Northern Ireland, and the conflict reflexively grew stronger as an imagina- tive focal point for
effective Irish American political agency. In that process, the Irish government and Irish
American political leaders challenged both Sinn Féin/IRA and their American supporters in the
1980s to think hard about their identity and history, moving away from a simplistic “Brits Out”
position on Northern Ireland to one that vigorously supported equality for Catholic nationalists
and Protestant unionists. This Irish American shift successfully pressured the British Government
to recognize the political and cultural rights of Catholic nationalists in the Anglo- Irish
Agreement of 1985, paving the way for the Good Friday Agreement peace settlement in 1998.
By the end of the 1980s, the growing Irish American support for the Irish government’s Northern
Ireland policies and the reduced following for Sinn Féin /IRA’s violence seemed to confirm
Kevin Kenny’s observation that a “version of ethnic identity could triumph only to the extent that
it was acceptable to those holding power in the society at large.” 112 At a very practi- cal level,
most Irish Americans with economic or cultural links to Ireland were reluctant to break ties with
the Irish government or its agencies in the United States, much less identify with an organization
fundraising for what the US government deemed terrorist activities. During the late 1980s, even
those Irish Americans who had been ambivalent about denouncing IRA violence realized that the
violence had gone on too long and was coun- terproductive. This thinking mirrored the increasing
consensus in Ireland that IRA violence, irrespective of its repugnance in moral terms, weakened
Irish nationalism with “nationalists north and south, and the Irish- American community all
divided on the question of the legitimacy of violence, thus preventing a political combination for
electoral or other purposes.” 113
In retrospect, the 1980s and the 1990s marked the high point of Irish ethnic political influence in
the US Congress and in the White House, a level of agency in both the United States and Ireland
unlikely to be achieved again, absent so compelling and emotional an issue for Irish America as
justice for fellow Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland. In 2018, a New York Times book reviewer
pointedly, if inaccurately, urged American Jews to embrace their Judaic culture, warning that
“American Jews are two or three
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56 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter 2020
generations away from being as Jewish as ‘Irish’ people whose Irishness consists of drinking
green beer on St. Patrick’s Day.” 114 Unlike Jewishness, Irish American ethnicity, lacking a
compelling political cause in Ireland— although Brexit is stirring old hostilities—is dependent in
the twenty- first century on Irish culture to foster an ethnic identity and a two- way relation- ship
with its changing homeland. Nor can it rely, as it did for so long, on constant replenishment
through immigration. Only time will tell whether this focus on cultural organizations and trans-
Atlantic exchanges will be sufficient to maintain a meaningful Irish American community
engaged in reciprocal interactions with Ireland, not imagined or merely symbolic, but rooted in
tangible associational and political processes of the kind that animated Irish ethnicity in the
1980s.
NOTES
1. Irish American Organizations, A Report on Their Activities in 1980 (hereafter Embassy Report ), Embassy of Ireland,
Washington, DC, Department of Foreign Affairs, Papers of Seán Donlon, Killaloe, County Limerick. Prior to his
appointment as Irish Ambassador to the United States in 1978, Donlon played a role in the 1973 Sunningdale
Agreement. In 1981, as Secretary General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, he was a principal architect of the
Anglo- Irish Agreement of 1985. Donlon joined the private sector in 1987 and later became a special advisor on
Northern Ireland to Taoiseach (Prime Minister) John Bruton. In 2016, he was appointed Chair of the Press Council of
Ireland, Honorary Degree Profile , National University of Ireland, www.nui.ie.
2. Sinn Féin Report on Irish American Organizations and Political Involvement (hereafter Sinn Féin Report ), John T.
Ridge Collection (AIA 068), Archives of Irish America, NYU.
3. “The Northern Ireland Problem in the USA,” January 21, 1981, 1, file P1050232, Archives of the Department of
Foreign Affairs.
4. Kevin Kenny, “Twenty Years of Irish American Historiography,” Journal of American Ethnic History 28, no. 4
(Summer 2009): 73. Thomas N. Brown, Irish- American National- ism (1966).
5. Brian Hanley, “The Politics of Noraid.” Irish Political Studies 19, no. 1 (2004): 4. 6. Ibid., 7. 7. Jack Holland, The
American Connection: U.S. Guns, Money and Influence in Northern Ireland (Dublin: Roberts Rinehart, 1987), 6.
8. Pete Hamill, “Notes for the New Irish: A Guide for the Goyim,” New York Magazine , March 13, 1972.
9. Tom Hayden, Irish on the Inside: In Search of the Soul of Irish America (New York: Verso, 2003).
10. Ambassador Donlon was also conscious of the fact that “official Ireland had lost contact with Irish- America in the
1960s on the issue of immigration. Robert Kennedy as Attorney General had offered Ireland a generous arrangement,
which the Lemass Gov- ernment, prompted by Ken Whitaker (Secretary of the Department of Finance) who was
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without the permission of the University of Illinois Press.
Smyth 57
concerned about continuing emigration, had firmly rejected—to the intense annoyance of Irish- America.” Donlon,
email interview with author, November 26, 2017.
11. Sinn Féin Report , “Overview,” 4. 12. Sinn Féin Report , “Appendices,” Peter King interview, 1. In 1981, King was
elected Nassau County Comptroller in Long Island, New York. In 1992, he was elected to the US House of
Representatives, becoming chair of the House Homeland Security Committee from 2011 to 2013. The AOH, the largest
Irish American organization, was founded in 1836 with the initial goals of protecting Catholic churches from attack and
assisting Irish Catholic immigrants.
13. In 1998, Sinn Féin/IRA eventually adopted this policy when it acceded to the Good Friday Agreement and ended its
campaign of violence.
14. The county associations were based on the traditional loyalty of Irish immigrants to their native county in Ireland.
The Emerald societies, organizations of American law enforcement officers or firefighters of Irish heritage, promoted
fraternalism and Irish cul- ture. Charitable organizations tended to attract business and professional classes with Irish
heritage and a myriad of cultural groups catered to a wide variety of tastes in Irish culture, music, dance and literature.
15. Minister’s Brief, Department of Foreign Affairs Archives, 3. 16. Seán Donlon, email interview with author,
November 26, 2017. John Hume, a civil rights leader in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s, became leader of the
nonviolent nation- alist party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), in 1979 and was the principal architect
of the Northern Ireland peace process for the two decades leading up to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.
17. Ronald Reagan: “Statements on St. Patrick’s Day,” March 17, 1981, accessed April 12, 2018,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43547. IRA bombings of civilians in London, especially the Harrods
department store bombing in London in 1983, alienated most Irish Americans from the IRA. In 1985, President
Reagan, prompted by Speaker O’Neill, pressured British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to sign the Anglo- Irish
Agreement, giving Dublin a role in Northern Ireland for the first time. Asked later by the chairman of the British
Conservative Party why she had agreed to this concession, Mrs. Thatcher replied, “It was the Americans who made me
do it.” Quoted in Maurice Fitzpatrick, John Hume in America (Newbridge, Co. Kildare: Irish Academic Press, 2017),
130.
18. Holland, The American Connection , 151. 19. Embassy Report , “Summary by Ambassador,” 1. Thirty million of the
forty million respondents who chose Irish ethnicity in the 1980 US Census reported multiple ancestry, leaving ten
million Americans as exclusively of Irish descent.
20. Ibid., 5. 21. Ibid., 1. 22. Matt Cooper, The Maximalist: The Rise and Fall of Tony O’Reilly (Dublin: Gill &
Macmillan, 2015), 125.
23. Embassy Report , “Summary by Ambassador,” 2. 24. Ibid., 1. 25. Ibid., 5. 26. Ibid., 4–5. 27. “How Ulster Became
an American Issue,” New York Times , March 28, 1981. From 1979 to 1998, the Times ’s editorials on the Irish conflict
were largely written by Karl E.
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58 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter 2020
Meyer, who had become fascinated by the issue during his time as Washington Post London bureau chief.
28. “Mrs. Thatcher Must Act to Ease Ulster’s Agony,” Philadelphia Enquirer , July 22, 1981.
29. Embassy Report , “Irish American Media,” 1. 30. Embassy Report , “Summary by Ambassador,” 5. 31. Embassy
Report , “Consulate General, New York,” 8. 32. Embassy Report , “Summary by Ambassador,” 2. 33. Embassy Report ,
“Consulate General, Boston,” 6. 34. Embassy Report , “Consulate General, Chicago,” 2. 35. Embassy Report ,
“Consulate General, New York,” 8. 36. Ibid., 2. 37. Embassy Report , “Summary by Ambassador,” 3. 38. Embassy
Report , “Consulate General, Boston,” 6. 39. Embassy Report , “Consulate General, Chicago,” 2. 40. Embassy Report ,
“Summary by Ambassador,” 3. 41. Maureen Murphy, ed., Guide to Irish Studies in the United States , American
Confer- ence for Irish Studies, 1982, Vertical Files, NYU.
42. Embassy Report , “Summary by Ambassador,” 1. 43. Edward D. Marman, The Encyclopedia of the Irish in
America , ed. Nathan Glazer (South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1999), 445–46.
44. Embassy Report , “Summary by Ambassador,” 1. 45. Mary P. Corcoran, “The Process of Migration and the
Reinvention of Self: The Experiences of Returning Irish Emigrants,” Éire- Ireland 37, nos. 1 and 2 (Spring/Summer
2002): 188.
46. Íde B. O’Carroll, Irish Transatlantics, 1980–2015 (Cork, Ireland: Attic Press, 2018), 56. The IIRM, founded in 1987,
sought to address the problem of thousands of undocumented Irish in the United States by changing the 1965
Immigration and Nationality Act which gave preference to immigrants with families in the United States. This Act
proved prejudicial to European countries like Ireland whose emigration to the United States had slowed in recent years.
See Marvine Howe, “Working to Help Irish Immigrants Stay, Legally,” New York Times , November 27, 1988.
47. Ibid., 4. 48. Ibid., 4. 49. Alan J. Schmidt, Fraternal Organizations (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), 158.
50. Embassy Report , “Summary by Ambassador,” 6. 51. Embassy Report , “Consulate General, New York,” 3–5. The
report noted that each of the New York County AOH Boards had between nine and thirteen active divisions with the
exception of Rockland County with five, and Albany with two. All sponsored local St. Patrick’s Day parades, plays,
concerts, feiseanna, Irish Field Days, Hibernian Days, and Communion Breakfasts, as well as “Masses for Peace” and
“Pro- Life” dinners.
52. Embassy Report , “Consulate General, New York,” 5. 53. Embassy Report , “Consulate General, Boston,” 7. 54. Ed
Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), 203.
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without the permission of the University of Illinois Press.
Smyth 59
55. Andrew Wilson, citing Ted Howell in Andrew J. Wilson, Irish America and the Ulster Conflict, 1968–1995
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 278.
56. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA , 72. 57. Ed Moloney, “Sinn Féin’s Secret 1988 Report on Noraid,” The
Broken Elbow, A View of the World from New York and Belfast , March 30, 2016 (Public PGP Key: 210D6F47), 3–4.
Declan Kearney in later years became chair of Sinn Féin and a member of the Northern Ireland assembly.
58. The MacBride Principles of fair employment, drafted by Nobel Laureate Seán Mac- Bride in 1984, became Federal
requirements for US employers in Northern Ireland in 1998.
59. Moloney, “Sinn Féin’s Secret 1988 Report on Noraid,” 3–4. 60. Patrick Mullin, a member of the Noraid executive,
received this report from Sinn Féin at his Yonkers, New York, home in November 1988. Mullin was one of five men
including Michael Flannery who had been charged by the US Attorney in New York in 1982 with conspiring to
smuggle weapons to the IRA. All five were subsequently acquitted by a jury who “believed defense contentions that
the Central Intelligence Agency had sanctioned their gun- running operation.” Robert D. McFadden, “Five Are
Acquitted in Brooklyn of Plot to Run Guns to IRA,” New York Times , November 6, 1982.
61. Letter from Sinn Féin to Joe Cahill and Ted Howell, November 1, 1988. Sinn Féin Report on Irish American
Organizations and Political Involvement , John T. Ridge Collec- tion, (AIA 068), Archives of Irish America, NYU.
62. In 1989, the Irish Voice was given some access to the Sinn Féin Report and noted that it “painted a picture of an
organization (Noraid) that was ghettoized and lacking in professionalism . . .after 17 years of existence it still had no
full- time worker.” “Noraid at the Crossroads,” Irish Voice , October 14, 1989.
63. Sinn Féin Report , “Overview,” 3. 64. Sinn Féin Report , “Conclusions,” 1. 65. Sinn Féin Report , “Cooperation and
Collaboration between INA and the IAC,” (G) 4; Sinn Féin Report , “Public Relations/Political Lobbying Mailings.”
66. Jimmy Breslin, “Life’s Gone Out of Irish in America Too,” New York Daily News , August 9, 1981.
67. Aogán Mulcahy, “Claims- Making and the Construction of Legitimacy: Press Cover- age of the 1981 Northern Irish
Hunger Strike,” Society for the Study of Social Problems 42, no. 4 (November 1995): 452.
68. John T. Ridge, The St. Patrick’s Day Parade in New York (New York: AOH Publica- tions, 1988), 171. 69. Ibid.,
171. 70. Farrelly had a brother active with Noraid in San Francisco and another who wrote for the An
Phoblacht/Republican News , Sinn Féin Report , “Appendix,” 3–5.
71. Sinn Féin Report , “Appendices,” 5. 72. Ibid., 4–5. Sinn Féin/IRA supporters, refusing to recognize the legitimacy
of the Irish Republic, referred to it as the Irish Free State. 73. Hanley, “The Politics of Noraid,” 1–17. 74. John T.
Ridge, The St. Patrick’s Day Parade in New York , 166. Sweeney was elected president of the AFL- CI0 in 1995.
75. Embassy Report , “Consulate General, San Francisco,” 8. 76. Hanley, “The Politics of
Noraid,” 5.
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60 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter 2020
77. Sinn Féin Report , “Appendices,” Joe Jameson, 1. 78. Ibid., Joe Jameson, 2. 79. Wilson, “Irish America and the
Ulster Conflict,” 216. 80. Sinn Féin Report , “Irish American Unity Conference,” 2. The Sinn Féin Report had little to
say about the Council of Presidents set up in January 1988 to focus “the collective muscle of the member organizations
upon selected issues.” Members, including the AOH, the IAUC, INA, and the Irish American Labor Coalition,
concentrated on five issues: Joe Doherty, visa denial, immigration, MacBride Principles, and the International Fund for
Ireland, the latter financed by the US Congress following the Anglo- Irish Agreement.
81. Sinn Féin Report , “The International Dimension,” Clann [sic] na Gael, notes on IAC (Irish American Community)
organizations.
82. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Clan na Gael”, April 6, 1988. New York Office,
file no. 199F- 1564, 2. FOIPA no.: 1386833. The FBI asset felt “confident that Allied Irish Bank would be a likely
institution” for distribution of those funds to Ireland.
83. Wilson, “Irish America and the Ulster Conflict,” 201. 84. Sinn Féin Report , Overview,” 4–5. 85. Embassy Report ,
“Summary by Ambassador,” 3. Donlon noted that the main centers of Noraid activity in 1980 “were New York city (5
units), elsewhere in New York state and New Jersey (7 units), Massachusetts (5 units), Pennsylvania (3 units),
Connecticut (3 units), California (4 units), Chicago (1 unit), Baltimore (1 unit) and Cleveland (2 units).”
86. Hanley, “The Politics of Noraid,” 6. 87. Embassy Report , “Consulate General, New York,” 7. 88. Ibid., “Consulate
General, Chicago,” 3. 89. Holland, The American Connection , 257. 90. Sinn Féin Report , “Ancient Order of Hibernians
in America, Inc.,” 6. 91. Sinn Féin Report , “Appendices,” Peter King. 2. 92. Peter King, Ireland House Oral History
Collection , (AIA. 030), 37. The Irish Civil War (1922–1923) divided those who supported the treaty with Britain
establishing a Free State for twenty- six of Ireland’s thirty- two counties from the anti- treaty forces who wanted a
completely independent Irish republic. The victory by Free State forces resulted in wide- spread loss of life, with many
embittered anti- treaty combatants emigrating to the United States, including Michael Flannery (later Noraid leader)
and Mike Quill (later leader of the Transit Workers Union).
93. Ibid.
94. Peter King, Ireland House Oral History Collection
95. Sinn Féin Report , “New York, Peter King,” 1.
96.    Danielle Zach, quoting John Ridge, Diaspora Movements, The Irish American (Dis) connection and the NI Troubles
(PhD diss., City University of New York, 2013), 253.
97.     Ibid.
98.     Ibid., “The Ancient Order of Hibernians,” 6.
99.     Ibid., 6.
100.   Embassy Report , Summary by Ambassador,3.
101.   Sinn Féin Report , “Irish National Caucus,” 1.
102.   Seán McManus, a Redemptorist priest from Northern Ireland
and brother of former MP Frank McManus and Patrick McManus, an IRA member killed in 1958.
103.    Holland, The American Connection , 248. 104. “Noraid at the Crossroads,” Irish Voice , October 14, 1989. 105.
Wilson, Irish America and the Ulster Conflict , 280–81. The name Friends of Irish Freedom came from an older
organization founded in New York to support Irish indepen- dence. It was founded in 1916 and was wound up in 1935.
106.    “No Split in Noraid,” Irish People , September 9, 1989. 107. INA [Noraid] National Executive Statement, The
Irish People , October 7, 1989. 108. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Irish Northern
Aid Committee,” New York Office, October 22, 1990, 1; file no: NY 199F- 1564, FOIPA no.: 1386833.
109.    Moloney, “Sinn Féin’s Secret 1988 Report on Noraid, 7. 110. Herbert J. Gans, “The End of Late- Generation
European Ethnicity in America?” Ethnic and Racial Studies 38, no. 3 (2015): 423.
111.    Kathleen Neils Conzen, David A. Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George E. Pozzetta, Rudolph J. Vecoli, “The Invention
of Ethnicity: A perspective from the U.S.A.,” Journal of American Ethnic History 12, no. 1 (Fall 1992): 32.
112.    Kevin Kenny, “Diaspora and Comparison: The Global Irish as a Case Study,” The Journal of American History 90,
no. 1 (June 2003): 147.
113.    Martin Mansergh, former advisor to Fianna Fail Taoisigh (Prime Ministers) Charles Haughey and Bertie Ahearn,
speaking at international symposium, University of Rennes, September 16, 1995, quoted in Eamonn Mallie and David
McKittrick, The Fight for Peace (London: Heinemann, 1996), 88–89.
114.    Gal Beckerman, “American Jews Face a Choice: Create Meaning or Fade Away,” New York Times Book Review, November 12, 2018.

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Irish American Organizations and the Northern Ireland
Conflict in the 1980s: Heightened Political Agency and Ethnic
Vitality